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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to consider the phenomena of love-melancholy through an object 
relations framework, conceiving of this phenomena as a revolt against mourning.  The theoretical 
framework utilized is the early object relations concepts introduced by Freud in his 1917 paper 
Mourning and Melancholia and elaborated by object relations theorist Melanie Klein in her later 
works.  Using the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) as a case example, this 
writer identifies a developmental process that occurs in resolving the pain of love-melancholy, 
emphasizing mourning the lost love object as necessary for establishing hope for future 
attachments. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
  
How heavy the days are. 
There's not a fire that can warm me, 
Not a sun to laugh with me, 
Everything bare, 
Everything cold and merciless, 
And even the beloved, clear 
Stars look desolately down, 
Since I learned in my heart that 
Love can die. 
- Hermann Hesse, 1911 
 
Imagine the following scenario.  A complete stranger approaches you with a confession. 
She states: “my heart is broken.”  Maybe this stranger’s lover has abandoned her.  She may be 
grieving the death of a family member.  Perhaps she has lost all of her belongings in a house fire, 
received a cancer diagnosis, or was denied custody of her children.  Even without any context for 
the events leading up to this stranger’s current feeling state, it is likely that you would be able to 
identify the distinct blend of sadness, disappointment, hopelessness, and pain imbued within the 
rather abstract concept of a broken heart.  The common narrative element linking the 
aforementioned possible scenarios is that something, or someone, has been lost.  Heartbreak is 
perhaps the most universally understood articulation of the complicated set of emotions that arise 
following a painful loss.  While loss is an inevitable reality of human existence, as evidenced by 
the falling of autumn leaves or by death itself, there is no evident consensus (not among 
laypersons nor experts) of the path one must take to resolve pain and distress resulting from the 
loss of romantic love. 
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My personal fascination with romantic heartbreak was initially sparked while I was 
engulfed by it my self.  Although the sadness I felt during this time is unforgettable, what I recall 
even more vividly is the raw and intense quality of my emotions.  I look back on this first 
heartbreak as a transformative awakening of my truest, deepest self.  I was simultaneously 
terrified and fascinated, miserable and thrilled.  Although a number of years have passed, I 
regularly think about this experience and am faced with new questions and realizations.  One 
element of heartbreak, evident in my own experience as well as commonly expressed in songs 
and poems, remains especially confusing.  What keeps the heartbroken person in the throes of 
distress?  I was able to uncover the beginnings of an answer to this question while listening to a 
pop song, Bonnie Raitt’s (1991) I Can’t Make You Love Me: 
“Here in the dark, in these final hours, I will lay down my heart and I'll feel the 
power. But you won't. No, you won't. ‘Cause I can't make you love me if you 
don't. I'll close my eyes, and then I won't see the love you don't feel when you're 
holding me. Morning will come and I'll do what's right; just give me till then to 
give up this fight. And I will give up this fight” 
While the protagonist is painfully aware that her feelings of love are unreturned, she begs 
to remain in the embrace of her uncaring lover at least until the morning comes, at which time 
she will relinquish the relational struggle.  The implication is that although she may be able to 
free herself from the immediacy of this pain as soon as tomorrow, she actually desires to hold on 
to the feeling for another night.  This signaled me to the understanding that there is something 
alluring about the refusal to let go of one’s attachment to a lost object, even when it is evident 
that love is unrequited or the romantic attachment has otherwise been severed.  
Despite the significant occurrence of intrapsychic distress resulting from romantic love 
and heartbreak, there is little research devoted to its etiology and best practices for treatment.  
Tallis (2004) states: “as a culture, we are happy to recognize an association between love and 
mental illness, only provided that it isn’t taken too seriously.  Perhaps this is why the link is most 
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frequently expounded, not in medical textbooks, but in popular songs.“ (p.258)  Due to 
intersecting social and historical factors, our modern view is that romantic distress is 
significantly mysterious, vexing, and torment-laden when compared to other forms of loss.  This 
air of mystery informs cultural narratives of love relationships, as well as contributes to clinical 
implications for the social work field regarding the treatment of individuals who are suffering 
from pain and distress arising from romantic love attachments.  
The aim of this paper is to consider the phenomena of love-melancholy through an object 
relations theoretical frame, in order to identify intrapsychic processes that may be operational in 
resolving the distress associated with this phenomena.  The theories utilized are the early object 
relations concepts introduced by Freud in his 1917 paper Mourning and Melancholia and 
expanded upon by object relations theorist Melanie Klein in her later works.  Using the film 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) as a case example, this writer identifies a 
developmental process that occurs in resolving the pain of love-melancholy, emphasizing 
mourning the lost love object as necessary for establishing hope for future attachments.  The 
following chapter will outline the conceptual and methodological frameworks employed within 
this paper.   
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CHAPTER II 
Conceptualization and Methodology 
 This paper begins with the proposition that distress arising from the experience of 
romantic heartbreak is a significant area of clinical concern.  Through a review of the relevant 
literature, I found that an analysis focused on the experience of romantic heartbreak resulting 
from relationship dissolution was not sufficient in encompassing the breadth of scenarios in 
which this distress may arise. To put this dilemma plainly, it was important for me to find a term 
that spoke to the pain and distress associated with romantic love in general rather than limiting 
the analysis to pain that arises during heartbreak. This led me to seek alternative terminology that 
would speak to the reality that distress may be activated both within love and in heartbreak.  
Within my research, I encountered the (now antiquated) concept of love-melancholy which 
Wells (2007) identifies as being rooted in both early medical and literary representations of 
distress arising from romantic love.  Modern sufferers of what was previously understood as 
love-melancholy may now identify this feeling state with terms such as: heartbroken, lovesick, 
lovelorn, or madly in love.  Love-melancholy, although not often utilized in our modern 
vernacular, fully encompasses the feeling state that I had previously struggled to name.  This 
exploration of love-melancholy as clinical phenomena generally seeks to address following 
questions: what is it about both romantic love and romantic heartbreak that feels painful? And, 
how is this pain ultimately resolved?  In order to address these questions, I first look to Freud’s 
(1917) theory of mourning and melancholia in which he postulates a series of intrapsychic 
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processes that occur following the loss of a love object.  This leads me to the work of Melanie 
Klein, object relations theorist, who elaborates on the concepts introduced by Freud. 
Theoretical Framework 
I came to utilize Freud’s (1917) Mourning and Melancholia as the initial theoretical 
framework when I noticed striking similarities between Freud’s articulation of symptoms arising 
within melancholia and symptoms associated with romantic heartbreak.  Importantly, Freud 
conceives of mourning and melancholia as almost identical processes yet articulates that while 
melancholia is generally regarded as pathological, mourning is regarded as healthy and normal.  
In order to more fully grasp the significance of mourning the loss of a love object, I looked to 
Freud’s (1915) work On Transience in which Freud explores the factors that contribute to a 
resistance against entering the mourning process.  My analysis of these works led me to conceive 
of the distress associated with love-melancholy as due, at least in part, to a resistance against 
mourning.   
Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917) provided a springboard for the exploration of 
Melanie Klein’s object relations theories.  Object relations theory positions relationships as 
central to intrapsychic development and functioning, and is thus useful in understanding distress 
associated with love-melancholy.  The Kleinian concepts that are central to this analysis are the 
significance of internal / external objects, introjection, projection, ambivalence, splitting, the 
developmental paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, reparation and guilt. Following the 
identification and exploration of these theoretical concepts, I employ an object relations analysis 
to an example of love-melancholy within the discussion section. 
Plan of Analysis 
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I’ve elected to use the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind as the mechanism of 
analysis.  The content and plot of this film offers the potential to identify each of the theoretical 
elements as they exist for the characters both practically, as well as in within their internal 
worlds. The fantasy world of the film allows us to access the subconscious journey of these 
characters, and thus becomes a useful case study that I can analyze clinically.  I am able to 
analyze this complex “case” in a deeply psychodynamic manner (and within the timeframe 
necessary) without actually being relationally connected as a therapist.  It is important to note 
here the work of Carel (2007) who engaged in an analysis of the same film, using Freudian and 
Kleinian theories and concepts.  While Carel’s (2007) work affirmed my choice in selecting this 
film as a basis for analysis (as it utilizes the same theories), I found it to be focused mostly on 
larger thematic elements present in the plot and thus did not specifically reference this work 
within the deeper exploration of the film as a case study. 
Perspective and Background 
 
It is important to state that I am a person that identifies as having experienced love-
melancholy in varying degrees, as referenced in the introduction. Most profoundly was within 
the context of a transformative heartbreak that occurred five years ago and was eventually 
resolved. Importantly, I identify as having personally experienced many of the intrapsychic 
processes that are discussed in this paper, particularly the move from part to whole object 
relations through mourning and the resulting increased security in internal object relations.  I 
have described ultimately coming away from this painful heartbreak experience as feeling more 
whole, with a more securely attached and rooted understanding of my self and all of my past and 
present attachments.  This heartbreak serves as a major point of origin of my intellectual 
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curiosity regarding the topic of this paper, and thus influenced the set of questions that I entered 
this inquiry with.  These questions are: 
‐ Why do heartbreak and romantic love in general, both include pleasurable feelings 
alongside feelings of distress and immense pain? 
‐ Is there a benefit to feeling the pain of heartbreak? 
‐ What contributes to the subject’s experience of heartbreak as a transformative life event? 
‐ Is there a process that one must go through to resolve the pain of heartbreak / love-
melancholy? 
	
Limitations 
 
 The methodological limitations of this inquiry begins with the reality that much of the 
relevant literature reflects the ideology that distress arising from romantic love is confusing, 
mysterious, and perhaps too abstract a concept to subject to analysis.  Furthermore, much of the 
relevant literature does not account for ways in which race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, ability, 
religion, or location factor into an individual’s experience of distress associated with romantic 
love.  In order to resist against the presumption that these intrapsychic processes are universal, I 
chose to end the paper with a section outlining how the identified theories may be utilized within 
the clinical setting rather than suggesting specific interventions.   
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CHAPTER III 
Love-Melancholy: The Dark Pleasure 
Straightway, a delicate fire runs in 
my limbs; my eyes 
are blinded and my ears 
thunder. 
 
Sweat pours out: a trembling hunts 
me down. I grow 
paler than grass and lack little 
of dying. 
(Excerpt from Sappho’s Poem of Jealousy trans. 
William Carlos Williams, 1958) 
 
When represented in song and poem, romantic love has readily been expressed as a form 
of physical and mental illness (Tallis, 2004). Ancient Greeks referred to love as theia mania, 
which translates in English as “madness from the gods”.  The poetry of Sappho provides some of 
the most compelling evidence of this affliction.  In Poem of Jealousy, Sappho observes the object 
of her affection in conversation with another suitor and becomes immediately overwhelmed with 
physical ailments arising from her jealous despair (Sappho, trans. 1958).  Wells (2007) describes 
how love-melancholy was constructed in early medicine as a disease of both the mind and body, 
in which the subject’s fixation on a beloved object results in an internal turmoil accompanied by 
external symptoms such as “weeping, sobbing, sighing, pallor, and agitation” (p. 2).  While love-
melancholy can be understood as a pathological condition, the concept of disease or sickness is 
often implied within the realm of all romantic love (Wells, 2007).  The move from “normal” love 
to pathologized love creates the impression that within the scope of romantic love, there is a 
potential disorder lying in wait.  “Normal” love and love-melancholy can thus be understand as 
markers on a spectrum of behavior, as Wells (2007) states, “encompassing wholly “normal” 
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experience and extreme, delusional behavior.” (p. 3)  The phenomena of love-melancholy is 
represented in both early medical literature (as well as poem and song) as a dark, overwhelming 
force that disrupts the subject’s ability to access reason while producing physical ailments and 
emotional distress. 
To focus entirely on the distress of love-melancholy would be a simplistic representation 
of the phenomena.  Wells (2007) identifies atra voluptus, or “dark pleasure” as a central 
operational element within this affliction.  While the subject may be tormented by the experience 
of love-melancholy, she also experiences some degree of pleasure within the fixation.  
According to Wells’ (2007) this paradoxical pleasure and pain can be understood as “a willfully 
indulged erotic suffering that holds the beloved prisoner by stripping her of any reality outside of 
her lover’s obsessive mind.”  The concept of the beloved object as contained within the psyche 
of the love-melancholic subject is a significant component of the phenomena, and informs the 
theoretical analysis.  The fixation of the love-melancholic sufferer on the beloved object leads to 
a psychic containment or devouring, which according to Wells’ (2007) can be understood as a 
“heavily disguised resistance to mourning the lost (or inaccessible) beloved.” (p. 12) 
Love-melancholy, while a somewhat antiquated term, provides a point of origin for 
understanding the intrapsychic processes that occur within the distress arising from romantic 
love or heartbreak.  This chapter will define and describe love-melancholy, explore the 
influential historical and social factors connected to this clinical phenomenon, and provide a 
review of the relevant empirical research as well as identify gaps in this research in order to lay 
the ground for theoretical analysis.   
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Love-Melancholy in Early Humoral Medicine 
The first mention of lovesickness in a medical text occurs in first century CE by Aretaeus 
the Cappadocian, where it is described as a depressive illness featuring the same symptoms as 
melancholia: depression, fear, eating disorders, insomnia, irritability, restlessness (Altbauer-
Rudnik, p. 87, 2012).  Whereas melancholia was thought to have no particular etiology, it was 
believed that lovesickness was caused by separation from the loved one. 
Until the eighteenth century all disease was understood through the framework of 
humoural theory.  The central idea of humoural theory was that the body was made up of four 
humours (black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm) and that illness resulted from an imbalance 
between them.  A Renaissance-era medical text describes the process of lovesickness, as 
"excessive mental action, due to constant meditation on the love object, dried and cooled the 
body, causing the dominance of black melancholy bile and deepening the person's despair and 
physical suffering" (Altbauer-Rudnik, p.88, 2012).  The word melancholia is actually derived 
from humoural concepts, melaina chole meaning excessive black bile.  Beginning in the early 
eighteenth century, love was cited as a potential cause for madness (specifically melancholia and 
mania) in a number of texts.  When the humoural model was eventually rejected during the 
eighteenth century (due to major discoveries regarding blood circulation), the diagnosis of love 
melancholy began to fade away, as its symptomatology and etymological origin were reliant on 
humoural theory.  Mania, not as specifically tied to humoural theory, began to receive increased 
clinical focus.  In the early nineteenth century, French physician Jean-Etienne-Dominique 
Esquirol described his patient’s distress regarding love as “erotomania” (Altbauer-Rudnik, p. 91, 
2012).  Esquirol described erotomania as a delusional disorder in which the patient is convinced 
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of a fantasy that the object of her desire loves her in return.  Presently, the DSM V diagnosis of 
Delusional Disorder (297.1) includes an erotomanic subtype.   
It is important to note that changing social attitudes towards romantic love, in addition to 
the evolution of medicine, also greatly influenced these diagnostic shifts.  In sixteenth-
seventeenth century England, medical ailments associated with separation from the love object 
(i.e. love melancholy) were frequently cited within critiques of the arranged marriages of the 
Elizabethan era and used to promote the significance of love between husband and wife, a 
distinctly Puritan value (Altbauer-Rudnik, p.89, 2012). Although the modern feeling state of 
romantic love and heartbreak may not have shifted too drastically since the classical age (as 
evidenced by the poems of Sappho), scientific and social factors greatly influence the way in 
which these feelings are understood over time.  Hopefully, this historical context illustrates the 
varied ways in which physical and mental health concerns related to romantic love / heartbreak 
may be socially constructed, and should always be understood as dependent on the norms and 
values of the culture and time in which they are being considered.   
Tennov’s Limerence 
   In the mid-1960’s Dr. Dorothy Tennov, a psychology professor, began research on the 
topic of romantic love.  Tennov’s research was initially inspired by a conversation with a female 
student who disclosed immense distress after being rejected by a romantic partner.  Tennov 
(1979) describes this student’s story as a moment of awakening, stating “what amazed me was 
that I suddenly realized that probably all around me, among colleagues and friends as well as 
students, was a form of suffering that is usually hidden” (p. 4).  Tennov describes scouring 
psychological texts and psychoanalytic writings on the topic of love to see how the hidden pain 
had been brought to light.  Tennov discovered that most of the research and writings on love 
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failed to capture the quality expressed by her student (and known to Tennov herself), stating: 
“the general view seemed to be that romantic love is mysterious, mystical, even sacred, and not 
capable, apparently of being subjected to the cool gaze of scientific inquiry” (p. 5).  Tennov went 
on to conduct interviews with over 500 individuals about their experiences of romantic love, 
encountering striking similarity.  Troubled by the vague and abundant definitions of “love”, 
Tennov coined the term limerence to stand for the feeling state and experience that is typically 
referred to as “being in love” (p. 16). 
Some defining characteristics of limerence include intrusive and preoccupying thoughts 
of the object of desire (limerent object, or L.O.), intense longing for reciprocation, heightened 
awareness of the L.O.’s positive qualities ranging from increased empathy to idealization, moods 
becoming dependent on the behavior of the L.O., and fear of rejection.  Tennov identifies the 
goal of reciprocation as integral to the experience of limerence.  However, even if reciprocation 
is attained through the initiation of a relationship (or by confession of similar feelings) residual 
uncertainty may arise.  Uncertainty may contribute both to the distress experienced by the 
limerent individual, as well as the intensity of the limerence.  Although half of the Tennov’s 
respondents reported experiencing severe depression in connection to a love affair, 95% 
described love as “a beautiful experience” (p. 5). These observations indicate that a certain level 
of pain and distress is inherent to the feeling state of being in love.  
Tennov (1979) states that while she initially expected to identify certain characteristics or 
temperaments that lead people to fall in love more readily than others, throughout the course of 
500+ interviews she was surprised to find how “so many people who differed greatly from each 
other described such similar subjective states” further stating that this inclined her to generalize 
“that the state of being in love could happen to anyone” (Tennov, p. 13, 1979). She then details a 
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pivotal discussion in which a colleague describes having never experienced the feeling state of 
“being in love” while involved in romantic relationships, although she had regarded these 
relationships as loving.  This indicates that while there is no ordained prerequisite for falling in 
love (and experiencing heartbreak), it is not guaranteed that every individual will experience this. 
Although Tennov speaks of differences between her interviewees, she provides virtually 
no demographic information for this population.  The only demographic information indicated is 
that she interviewed both men and women, from a range of ages, many of them connected to the 
college where she worked as a professor.  She does not report any statistical data and does not 
mention race, ethnicity, location, sexual orientation, gender identity, ability, or religious 
affiliation.   
Modern Symptomatology and Clinical Implications 
 
“When madly in love or desperately heart-broken, many of us manifest unusual 
behavior or experience upsetting episodes that are disruptive to our daily routine 
and sometimes even present danger” (Altbauer-Rudnik, p. 86, 2012) 
We have discussed the general idea that both romantic love and romantic heartbreak have 
the potential to incite emotional distress.  However, there are certain identifiable symptoms that 
arise from romantic heartbreak that may be useful in guiding the theoretical analysis and forming 
a modernized view of love-melancholy.  Field (2011) identifies symptoms that are shared by 
those who are experiencing bereavement and those who are experiencing romantic heartbreak.  
Some symptoms of romantic heartbreak include: intrusive thoughts and difficulty controlling 
them, sleep disturbances/insomnia, depression, anxiety, exaggerated attempts to re-establish the 
relationship, angry and vengeful behavior, and substance use (Field, p. 382, 2011).  Tallis (2004) 
further cites obsessive thinking and OCD, mania, and suicide as potential areas of concern for 
those suffering from lovesickness.   
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Importantly, Field (2011) identifies biochemical changes that occur in both bereavement 
and romantic heartbreak.  One study using fMRI scans found increased blood flow to the 
cingulate cortex in women who were grieving the loss of a romantic relationship.  Brain activity 
involving the cingulate cortex is associated with rejection, sadness, anger, and anxiety (Field, p. 
384, 2011). 
Field further discusses two significant observations that support the assertion that the 
feelings associated with romantic heartbreak are similar to those associated with romantic love.  
One study examined fMRI scans of women who were recently rejected by romantic partners (but 
still very much in love) alongside women who were happily partnered, and found that the areas 
of the brain associated with physical pain lit up for both groups when women were shown photos 
of their loved one.  Field further reports, “the brain releases similar chemicals for both romantic 
breakups and romantic love including pheromones, dopamine, norepinephrine, epinephrine and 
serotonin” which attests to the similarity of these feeling states (p. 384).  If romantic love and 
romantic heartbreak are so closely linked, it follows that even those who are happily partnered 
may experience some of the same distressing symptoms as those who are heartbroken. These 
aforementioned biopsychosocial factors create a clear indication that love-melancholy is an area 
that deserves increased clinical attention due to the severity and breadth of symptoms associated 
with it. 
So far, we have established foundational elements of love-melancholy as clinical 
phenomena: 
 Clinical conceptualizations of love-melancholy are temporally rooted and socially 
constructed, impacting diagnosis and treatment 
 Both romantic love and heartbreak include feelings of distress and pleasure. 
 A central theme of love-melancholy is the rejection of the mourning process in 
favor of the ongoing erotic fixation, a refusal to accept transience  
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With these foundations in mind, it is useful to move towards a deeper analysis of the process of 
mourning and melancholia as they relate to the clinical phenomena of love-melancholy.  The 
following chapter will generally identify Freud’s psychodynamic contributions to the topic 
romantic love and distress, introduce the major concepts of Freud’s (1917) Mourning and 
Melancholia, and provide a basis for a theoretical analysis of the phenomena. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Freud’s Mourning, Melancholia, and pre-Object Relations theories 
 
Freud’s (1917) Mourning and Melancholia is regarded as one of the most important 
contributions to the discipline of psychoanalytic theory, and helps to illuminate Freud’s prolific 
legacy.  Within this text Freud introduces a number of concepts integral to many of his later 
theories and formative to the object relations theorists that follow him, especially Melanie Klein 
(Bergmann, 2009).  Speaking to the significance of this work as a benchmark within the 
evolution of Freudian thought, Aslan (2009) identifies this paper as widely regarded by authors 
and theorists “as a hinge—an articulation—between the first, ‘topographic’ theory of the mind, 
and the second, ‘structural’ theory” (p. 188).   
The focus of this chapter is to name and describe the concepts and processes that Freud 
hypothesizes as operational within mourning and melancholia, and to identify the initial seeds 
that blossom into object relations theory.  The larger aim of this task is to later utilize these 
theories to frame a discussion of intrapsychic processes and mechanisms that are operational 
within love-melancholy and conversely may provide relief from the pain and anguish associated 
with it. 
A secondary yet imperative task of this chapter is to provide the reader with a contextual 
basis for Freud’s ideas.  This will be achieved through a review of Freud’s understanding of 
romantic love, discussion of the historical and theoretical precursors to the 1915 paper, and a 
glance at the subsequent expansions and alterations that followed.  While examining a work of 
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this magnitude and influence it can be tempting to fall into an ahistorical and oversimplified 
analysis of the concepts presented.  However, Freud’s own warnings against overgeneralization 
as well as the uncertainty and curiosity made evident within his writing style remind us that it is 
necessary to view Mourning and Melancholia with a lens of liminality (Dozois, 2000; Quinodoz, 
2009). 
The work of this chapter involves the demystification of complex theoretical concepts.  
That being said, there are some ongoing mysteries that have been left uncovered by myself as 
well as by the writings I’ve encountered through review of the relevant literature.  For instance, 
one element that has proved especially frustrating to me is that Freud does not explicitly identify 
the melancholic process outlined in Mourning and Melancholia in relation to distress associated 
with romantic love attachments.  The words “loss of the love object” seem to appear 
unrelentingly in Freud’s (1915) articulation of melancholia, and the identified symptoms of this 
affliction clearly evoke the familiar dark pleasure of the phenomena: 
“…profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of 
the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding 
feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and 
culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (p. 244) 
 
That being said, the majority of modern scholarship focused on Mourning and Melancholia 
frames Freud’s melancholia as an early rendering of the cluster of symptoms and experiences we 
presently understand as clinical depression (Dozois, 2000; Weiss & Lang, 2000).  How do we 
account for the fact that Mourning and Melancholia is neither primarily, nor widely, understood 
as a paper about the pain of romantic love and heartbreak? Not by Freud during his lifetime, nor 
by modern psychodynamic thinkers and writers.  Looking first towards Freud’s major 
contributions to the realm of romantic love and heartbreak provides the contextual base for a re-
reading of mourning and melancholia as a paper about love’s pain. 
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Freud’s Three Theories of Love 
Bergmann (1988) explains that Freud approached the inquiry of love with hesitation, 
fearing that a psychoanalytic perspective on romantic love would prove clumsy when compared 
to the contributions of poets.  This hesitation is perhaps only evident in that Freud never fully 
articulated a complete theory of love, and instead funneled his ideas into three mostly divergent 
theories of love each with their own trajectory and implications.  The breadth of Freud’s 
influence on our modern conceptualization of romantic love is immense, however, based on 
evidence garnered from personal correspondences (as well as Freud’s never developing a 
cohesive theory of love) Bergmann (1980) asserts that Freud did not believe he could fully 
articulate a metapsychology of love comparable to his work on dreams.  In a 1907 letter to Jung, 
Freud writes, “When I have totally overcome by libido (in the common sense), I shall undertake 
to write a love life of mankind” (Bergmann, p. 58, 1980).  Although lessons on love are bountiful 
in many of his works, a cohesive love life of mankind authored by Freud has never been seen nor 
heard of.  While considering the application of Freudian theory to the concept of romantic 
heartbreak, it is useful to be aware of the aforementioned complexities that Freud may have felt 
regarding the topic of romantic love.  With this in mind, we will now review the three primary 
developments articulated by Freud under the domain of romantic love. 
According to Bergmann (1988), Freud’s first major contribution to the phenomena of 
romantic love is the genetic theory initially articulated in Three Theories of Sexuality (1905).  
During infancy, the mother-child relationship serves as a prototype for all love relationships that 
follow and is characterized by the infant’s simultaneous tender and erotic feelings for the parent 
(sensory pleasure and need-gratification experienced by the infant through breastfeeding is an oft 
cited metaphorical and practical example of this).  In latency, the child’s erotic impulses towards 
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the parent are repressed while the tender feelings remain.  Then, during adolescence, the erotic 
and tender feelings rejoin and may be directed towards another (nonincestuous) object.  Freud 
suggested that the inability to love and/or attain sexual gratification might be a result of the 
tender and/or erotic currents failing to join together.  A number of theorists furthered these 
genetic concepts as a means of differentiating between mature and immature love.  Klein, for 
example, focused on splitting (dichotomized idealization and devaluation of the object) as a 
feature that arrests development at the primitive, oral position and prevents one from reaching 
the mature, genital position where the good and bad parts of the object are more fully integrated.   
Freud’s second theory of love introduces the self (or ego) as a potentially influential 
factor in love object choice, and appears in his 1914 paper On Narcissism.  Freud (1914) states 
that a person may love “what he himself is, what he himself was, what he himself would like to 
be, someone who was once part of himself” (p.90).  Strachey (1957) cites this paper as especially 
important as it introduces the concept of the self-governing ego ideal that is integral to the 
structural theory model.  Freud (1914) additionally makes distinctions between libido directed 
towards the ego versus libido directed towards the object, thus providing a starting point for 
concepts further explored in Mourning and Melancholia (1915) concerning the direction of 
cathetic energy.  Plainly, this second theory of love introduces the notion that one’s internal 
understanding and experience of self is present in both love object choice and relations. 
Bergmann (1980) describes Freud’s third theory of love as lacking in clarity and 
indicative of Freud’s struggle to identify the manner by which sexual drives may transform into 
love.  This appears in Instincts and Vicissitudes (1915), which Bergmann (1980) describes as 
“one of Freud’s difficult essays” (p.655).  Freud (1915) concludes that while love does not derive 
from the sexual instinct it does encompass “the expression of the whole current of sexual 
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feelings” (Bergmann, p. 655, 1980).  Although Freud continued to elaborate on the qualities and 
nature of love in relation to these theories, Bergmann (1980) states that there were no entirely 
new concepts introduced regarding romantic love following Instincts and Vicissitudes (1915). 
Bergmann (1980) concludes his discussion of these three theories by identifying the 
important contributions made by Freud that form our modern conceptualization of romantic love, 
naming the following processes: “refinding, hoping to find what was denied, idealization, and 
integration” (p. 670).  Although Freud did not appear to reach a finalized metapsychology of 
love, he leaves ample fertile ground for further exploration and discovery.  While many of these 
concepts, especially those articulated in On Narcissism (1914), are influential to and even 
explicitly revisited in Mourning and Melancholia (1915) Freud may have been hesitant to 
explicitly discuss intrapsychic mechanisms of romantic heartbreak in the absence of a concrete 
and finalized theory of love. 
Historical and Theoretical Precursors 
 While we have discussed Freud’s own theories of love that predate 1915’s Mourning and 
Melancholia, there are additional theoretical and historical precursors that are influential to this 
work.  As with discussion of any theory or ideological premise, it is necessary to conceive of the 
theorist as a human being with a certain individual experience that the theory itself cannot 
escape.  One way to facilitate this understanding is to locate the sociocultural and historical 
landscape that the theorist exists within at the time of the theory’s construction.  This process 
may allow us to better avoid attributing omnipotence to the theorist, which tends to cloak the 
theory in an impenetrability that is counter to the aim of critical analysis.  Freud’s intersecting 
identities of father, son, teacher, Jew, husband, and friend (as well as his early career and training 
in medicine) all provide points of entry to significant elements related to the initial development 
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of this theory as well as its evolution (Dozois, 2009).  Although I will not address each potential 
influence individually, as that is the work for a much longer paper, I will highlight those that are 
most notable to Freud’s process in constructing this work. 
 Dozois (2009) states that Freud initially identified a connection between mourning and 
melancholia in an unpublished draft written in 1895, arguing that melancholia arose from “grief 
over to some (probably libidinal) loss” (p.173).  The timeline following this initial observation 
becomes a bit murky, as it seems that a number of psychoanalytic thinkers in Freud’s circle were 
considering the etiology and symptoms of melancholia as well as beginning to consider relations 
between ego and object.  In 1911, Freud’s student Karl Abraham conducted a case study of six 
patients with severe depression and remarked; “hostility and libidinal ambivalence impaired their 
ability to love” (Dozois, p. 171, 2009).  This is a close articulation to the concepts more fully 
explored by Freud in Mourning and Melancholia, which was written after this finding and 
Abraham is credited in a footnote to Freud’s paper to honor the significance of these 
observations.  Dozois (2009) suggests that while the timeline of these writings is in favor of 
Abraham as originator, Abraham eventually identified his 1911 contribution as influenced by 
Freud’s earlier articulations of libido, introjection, and object loss.  The concept of introjection 
was also borrowed and modified from Freud’s student Ferenczi, who first noted this process in 
his 1909 paper exploring transference (Dozois, 2009).  These pathways are congruent with 
Freud’s own observation that the field of psychoanalysis was reliant upon the exploration of 
long-held ideas.  As Dozois (2009) succinctly points out, Freud never claimed Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917) to be an entirely original work. 
While considering the intellectual climate that this paper arose from, it is important to 
mention that Mourning and Melancholia (1917) is one in a series of twelve papers that Freud 
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completed between 1914 and 1915.  Ogden (2009) explains that Freud intended to compile these 
papers into a book titled Preliminaries to a Metapsychology, however only five of the works 
were ever published.  Freud destroyed the remaining seven essays, and commented to Ferenczi 
that these works deserved “suppression and silence” (Ogden, p.150, 2009).  Any further 
reasoning for this silencing remains unknown.  In addition to the intensity of Freud’s intellectual 
and academic life at this time, World War I was a traumatic daily reality for Freud at this time 
(Dozois, 2000).  Two of Freud’s three sons were fighting on the front lines, and a number of his 
friends and colleagues had been recruited.  Furthermore, basic resources like food and fuel were 
scarce.  Although Mourning and Melancholia was completed in 1915, the war halted its’ 
publication until 1917.  
A few months after his completion of Mourning and Melancholia, Freud (1915) 
published a paper titled On Transience where he utilizes his theory of mourning to address the 
collective, permeating feeling of loss and anguish brought by the destruction of the Great War.  
In this text Freud recounts walking in the countryside one year earlier with a young poet friend 
who, while noting the beauty of the landscape around them, described being unable to derive any 
joy from the scene due to his knowing that it would eventually fade away—decay and die in the 
winter.  Freud expresses disbelief at such a sentiment, citing many examples in which transient 
beauty may still be both experienced and remembered as beauty nonetheless.  As the poet 
remains unconvinced, Freud observes that the evident resistance towards divesting energy from 
things once loved and now lost is embedded within the process of mourning.  Freud then locates 
us in his present, using stirringly passionate language to describe the war that has not only 
eviscerated the countryside he and the poet had looked upon one year earlier, but shook the very 
foundation of Germany—robbing its people of what they had once loved and the ideals they held 
23 
 
in highest regard (Freud, p. 307, 1915). In the face of these immense losses, Freud is able to offer 
a beacon of promise for the future wherein walking the painful path of mourning allows room for 
new love to enter.  The concept of transience will be revisited throughout this paper as a 
significant component of mourning and of love itself. 
Mourning and Melancholia (1917) 
Freud’s (1917) inquiry into the nature of melancholia begins with comparison.  He 
identifies melancholia as nearly identical to mourning in all regards, save for one important 
distinguishing feature.  This significant difference then provides the basis for his analysis of 
melancholia’s process.  Let us consider Freud’s articulation of mourning as a point of origin. 
Mourning 
 Mourning is defined by Freud (1917) as a reaction that occurs following the loss of a 
loved person, or in certain cases, the reaction to a significant loss that may be somewhat less 
concrete—i.e. the loss of one’s ideals or freedom (p. 243).  While painful, mourning is 
nonetheless viewed as a normal, non-pathological process.  Freud (1917) explains that it is often 
thought that any interference with the process of mourning is likely useless and potentially even 
harmful to the mourner (p. 244).  The features of mourning include: a painful state of mind, loss 
of interest in the outside world, inhibition of activity, loss of the ability to adopt a new love, and 
rejection of thought that does not involve the lost person.  These symptoms indicate a strong 
libidinal attachment to the lost love object, as energy is directed towards thoughts and memories 
of this person. When mourning is progressing as normal, there is a repeated and painful 
reckoning of the loss that has occurred.  Freud notes that opposition to the loss is to be expected, 
explaining; “people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a 
substitute is already beckoning to them” (p. 244).  Despite this opposition, reality typically sets 
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in.  Each time the mourner is met with thoughts and memories of the lost person, she is reminded 
that the loss is real and final.  Eventually this struggle gives way to a detachment of libidinal 
energy from the lost object, and is free to be directed towards another. 
Melancholia   
 As in mourning, melancholia is a state that arises following the loss of a love object.  
Freud (1917) suggests that in the case of melancholia, the nature of the loss may somewhat less 
conscious than in mourning—“he knows whom he has lost, but not what he has lost in him” (p. 
245).  In both mourning and melancholia, the loss may be as concrete as an actual death, or as 
abstract as the loss of an ideal.  The distinguishing difference between these two states is an 
extreme diminishment in self-regard that is present in melancholia, yet not in mourning.  This 
low self-regard can result in sadistic impulses of self-punishment and, in extreme cases, suicide.  
Freud (1917) states that this negative sense of self reflects an “impoverishment of the ego on 
grand scale” (p. 246).  This raises the question of how object loss transforms into what we can 
understand as a kind of ego loss.  Freud (1917) comes to a suggestion of how this transformation 
occurs by observing the nature of the melancholic’s self-criticism.  While considering the 
melancholic’s specific complaints it is often evident that these accusations are more accurately 
attributed to the lost love object, yet they are somehow misdirected towards the self.  He states; 
“so we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches 
against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego” (Freud, 
p. 248, 1917).  Now we will examine the processes by which this occurs. 
Identification and Introjection 
 According to Aslan (2009), Freud uses the terms identification and introjection 
interchangeably to describe the process by which object loss transitions into an impoverishment 
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of ego.  However, later theories (both articulated by Freud, as well as object relations theorists 
that followed) have expanded our understanding of these terms by naming subtle yet important 
differences between them.  Aslan (2009) describes introjection as the process by which “an 
external object and all its relations with the ego (the self) are internalized into the psyche, 
keeping their identity and characteristics as object, as subjectively perceived” (p. 164).  Plainly, 
this describes the internal sense that we have of ourselves, of others, and of ourselves in relation 
to others.  Identification is somewhat more complex.  Aslan (2009) states that identification is a 
process by which the ego takes on some or all of the characteristics of the external or internal 
object.  In identification, it seems that these characteristics come to be understood as intrinsic to 
the ego.   
The Melancholic’s Narcissistic Identification 
 Freud (1917) identifies some necessary precursors to the identification that occurs within 
melancholia.  He explains that the libidinal attachment to the lost love object must be quite 
strong and that it must also contain a certain level of ambivalence, usually due to some 
disappointment or pain associated with the object prior to the loss.  As stated earlier, the 
characteristic of self-reproach evident in melancholia arises from anger towards the lost love 
object that is directed towards the self.  In mourning, libidinal energies are slowly divested from 
the lost object and are eventually free to be directed towards a new object.  However, in 
melancholia, the object is instead consumed by the ego in a narcissistic identification—“and thus 
the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special 
agency, as if it were an object, the forsaken object” (Freud, p. 249, 1917).  Negative impulses 
can then be directed towards the ego (wherein the object is consumed) while love towards the 
lost object may be preserved, thus in some way preserving the love-relation in spite of the loss.  
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This struggle both reinforces, and is reinforced by, unconscious and ongoing ambivalence 
towards the lost love object.  The melancholic is unable to face the loss, and instead of engaging 
in the painful disconnection that is a requirement of normal mourning, retains the narcissistic 
identification as an attempt to protect the love relation from extinction at a cost to the ego 
(Ogden, 2009). 
Seeking a Resolution 
 While Freud (1917) compellingly demystifies the complex and nuanced processes of both 
mourning and melancholia, he stumbles in identifying the steps necessary for a resolution of 
melancholia.  There is a brief discussion of mania resulting from the direction of libidinal 
energy, yet this is left mostly unresolved.  Freud does suggest that the struggle of ambivalence 
may be integral to the resolution of melancholia (just as the continual recognition of death is 
integral resolution of mourning), yet we are left without a clear conclusion on this matter. 
Now that the theory has been prefaced with the relevant Freudian theories of love, 
historically situated, and its concepts and processes fully outlined and described it is useful to 
move to a discussion of the object relations theories that resulted from this foundational work.  
I’ve chosen to focus on Melanie Klein’s contributions to object relations theory, with specific 
attention to the concepts of ambivalence, splitting, and progression from the paranoid-schizoid 
position to the depressive position. 
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CHAPTER V 
Melanie Klein’s Object Relations 
The general focus of all object relations theory is the self’s relation to others, specifically 
how internal representations of external objects contribute to intrapsychic structure and ego 
functioning.  In an overview of object relations theory, Melano Flanagan (2011) quotes object 
relations theorist Melanie Klein to stress the general applicability of this concept; “there is no 
instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external 
or internal; in other words, object relations are at the center of emotional life” (p. 118). Object 
relations theory is well suited for an analysis of how the loss of a love object may impact 
intrapsychic functioning. 
Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917) is regarded as the first articulation of how 
internalization of an object can influence the nature of one’s psychic structure (Melano Flanagan, 
2011).  This assertion set the stage for a theory of object relations, composed of several separate 
and sometimes divergent theoretical schools of thought.  The commonality that joins these 
separate schools is the shared focus on the significance of relationships to ego formation.  
Mitchell & Black (1995) identify Klein as the foremost contributor to contemporary 
psychoanalytic thought following Freud, due to her observations of early childhood anxieties that 
led to the formulation of the developmental paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.  This 
chapter will outline Klein’s major theoretical contributions with specific focus on the paranoid-
schizoid and depressive positions, detailing their characteristic anxieties, processes, and 
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purposes. In the interest of regarding the theorist as a product of a specific time and place, we 
will begin with the historical context for Klein’s life and work while briefly addressing 
controversies regarding her clinical techniques. 
Notes on Klein’s Life and Work 
Melanie Klein was born in Vienna to Jewish parents, and experienced significant losses 
and grief through her young life.  Klein entered young adulthood plagued by depression.  Klein 
always had intellectual aspirations, and lacked satisfaction in her life as mother and wife.  In 
1914, Klein discovered Freud’s work on dreams and this sparked her intense fascination with 
psychoanalysis.  This same year she entered into psychoanalysis, with Ferenczi, a disciple of 
Freud and began her own academic inquiry into the field through analysis and observation of her 
own children.  Klein’s work began to garner significant attention, and in 1926 she was invited to 
move to England by Freud translator Ernest Jones and this is where she would continue to work 
until her death (Mitchell & Black, 1995). 
Throughout her career in psychoanalysis, Klein consistently identified that the goal of her 
work was to confirm and elaborate upon Freud’s theories through observation and clinical work 
with children (Mitchell & Black, 1995).  In the late 1920’s, a significant rift was evident between 
followers of Klein and followers of Anna Freud, daughter of Sigmund, due to significant 
disagreements between the two theorists regarding the psychoanalysis of children.  Anna Freud 
suggested that the egos of children were too fragile to participate effectively in psychoanalysis, 
while Klein suggested that children were equally as analyzable as adults so long as appropriate 
technique was employed.  Klein engaged in analysis of children’s play in a similar manner to the 
way that Freud analyzed the dreams of adults. Within a series of discussions that took place at 
the British Psychoanalytic Society, clear and marked differences between the Kleinians and 
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Anna Freudians were identified and this solidified the rift into a clear and permanent (existing to 
this day) separation between the two theoretical camps.  Critics of Kleinian technique and theory, 
even today, tend to problematize the overwhelmingly interpretive nature of Klein’s work, 
especially regarding her observations of the psyche of preverbal infants and young children 
(Mitchell & Black, 1995).  Even though Klein’s methods are viewed as controversial and 
questionable, her contributions to the field of psychoanalysis and elaboration of Freud’s theories 
are nonetheless regarded as significant. 
External Objects / Internal Objects 
Melano Flanagan (2011) cites consumption as integral to object relations theories, 
comparing the psychic incorporation of ones’ external experiences of and relationship to others 
to the body’s process of taking in food to be metabolized.  Just as individual bodies metabolize 
nutrients differently, there are varied ways in which individual psyches may incorporate certain 
characteristics or elements of the object (p. 121).  This metaphor invokes the concepts of 
introjection and identification that Freud (1917) had begun to explore within Mourning and 
Melancholia, and then became centrally operational in Klein’s understanding of the psyche. 
Klein, alongside contemporaries such as Radó (1928), often utilized the metaphor of the 
infant suckling at her mother’s breast as the earliest example of incorporation of external object 
relations into the inner psychic structure of the infant.  The infant receives gratification, comfort, 
pleasure, and fulfillment when she takes in milk from her mother’s breast.  Through this positive 
interaction, she experiences the actual live mother (or the external object) as a force of good 
while simultaneously engaged in an internalized experience of feeling goodness, fulfillment, and 
love.  This internalization contributes to the formation of an internal object, or phantasized 
imago, of mother as “good object”.  The external mother is felt (internally) by the infant to hold 
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these gratifying characteristics, and the benevolent external object matches up with the internal 
object representation. The infant’s view of self (ego) is shaped by introjection in that the infant is 
able to view herself as worthy of love, gratification, and fulfillment via the object relation. 
Through the process of projection, the infant’s established internal object influences her 
perception and experience of the external object over time.  Klein (1946) explains the cyclical 
and incorporative nature of this process; “thus from the beginning object-relations are moulded 
by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and 
situations.” (p. 2) Importantly this process is established at a time marked by omnipotence, prior 
to the infant’s capacity for reality testing, rendering external and internal objects 
indistinguishable (Mitchell & Black, 1995).     
In Klein’s view, internal object representations are shaped by unconscious or phantastical 
desires / anxieties alongside interactions with external objects occurring in the real world.  
Mitchell and Black (1995) explain the Freudian view that the object is discovered by the subject 
as a means to satisfy or frustrate existing libidinal impulses. Klein departs from this and suggests 
that libidinal desires and frustrations are innately connected, at their origin, to external objects 
and internal object representations; “the object of desire was implicit in the experience of desire 
itself” (Mitchell & Black, p.91, 1995).  While Freud’s focus is the libidinal drives, Klein’s 
emphasis is the object relationship.  Klein’s most important contribution, for the purposes of this 
inquiry regarding romantic heartbreak, is her identification of two distinct developmental 
positions in which the infant moves from experiencing part-object relations in the paranoid-
schizoid position to experiencing whole-object relations in the depressive position (Klein, 1935; 
Klein, 1946).  Use of the term position (as opposed to stage) is intentional, as it speaks to the 
idea that one can regress to or repeat these processes over the lifetime. 
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The Paranoid-Schizoid Position 
Importantly, just as the infant experiences fulfillment by the “good” external object 
(establishing the “good” internal object) through the need-gratification offered by the mothers’ 
breast, the infant also experiences significant anxiety and frustration when the mother’s breast is 
not available to her.  When the external object is not providing satisfaction it is perceived as the 
“bad” object, and thus internally represented as bad as well.  Klein (1935) posits that the infant 
projects an aggressive impulse onto these “bad” internalized objects, which leads to the infant’s 
understanding of these internal objects as dangerous persecutors attacking her from within.  The 
infant’s aggression towards the denying breast forms an object relationship marked by sadistic 
impulses and persecutory anxieties (Klein, p. 262, 1935).  Klein (1946) identifies this state of 
persecutory anxiety as the hallmark of an early, primitive developmental position in the life of 
the infant—the paranoid-schizoid position.  The term “paranoid-schizoid” was coined by Klein 
to speak to the nature of the persecutory anxieties (paranoia) as well as the anxiety of being 
destroyed from within, the same threat of disintegration / falling to pieces that is commonly seen 
as the primary anxiety operational in schizophrenia.  
Occurring within the first few months of the infants’ life, the paranoid-schizoid position 
is defined by the defensive process of splitting external/internal “good” objects and 
external/internal “bad” objects. At this time the infant is unable to conceive of the breast (or the 
object) as a singular force that provides both gratification and denial.  The splitting provides a 
defensive function for the infant in that she is able to protect the internal “good” objects, and 
herself, from the destructive and persecutory “bad” objects through the separation. As her 
aggressive desires and frustrations are directed towards the “bad” object, devaluation and hatred 
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of the “bad” object (both internal and external) increase. On the other side of this, idealization of 
the “good” object is ramped up through the process of projection and introjection maintaining 
this object as endlessly benevolent and deserving of fierce protection and possession. This 
process of idealization/devaluation leads to a fear of the loved “good” object being lost or 
destroyed and an impulse to contain it within the ego.  In normal progression, the process of 
splitting gives way to an ambivalent reconciliation in which one enters the depressive position. 
The Depressive Position 
With each instance of introjection and projection that occurs within the paranoid-schizoid 
position, the infant is confronted with the reality that the good object and bad object are one in 
the same and thus moves towards a more whole object relation (Klein, 1935). This process is 
identified with sharp clarity in the conclusion to A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-
Depressive States: 
“…at this stage of development the unification of external and internal, loved and 
hated, real and imaginary objects is carried out in such a way that each step in the 
unification leads again to a renewed splitting of the imagos. But as the adaptation 
to the external world increases, this splitting is carried out on planes which 
gradually become increasingly nearer and nearer to reality. This goes on until love 
for the real and the internalized objects and trust in them are well established. 
Then ambivalence, which is partly a safeguard against one’s own hate and against 
the hated and terrifying objects, will in normal development again diminish in 
varying degrees.” (Klein, p.288, 1935) 
The infant is able to begin to recognize the once separate “good” and “bad” breast as the 
actually whole mother, with whom she has a dynamic relationship.  The ego begins to more fully 
identify with both internal/external objects, and defenses of expulsion and destruction become 
less valuable due to the realization that this would lead to the destruction of both “good” and 
“bad” internal objects.   
The whole object relation is accompanied by the reckoning that there is potential for the 
loved object to be lost, signifying the infant’s arrival to the depressive position. According to 
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Klein, the depressive position is characterized by mourning; “not until the object has been loved 
as a whole can its loss be felt as a whole.” (p. 264). 
The primary anxiety within the depressive position is that, due to real or imagined 
threats; the love object will be lost or destroyed (Klein, 1935).  This threat applies to both the 
external love object as well as the internal object representation.  Klein states that this anxiety is 
accompanied by recognition of the sadistic impulses towards the now whole object that was once 
regarded in part as “bad”, resulting in feelings of guilt and a desire for reparation.  Importantly, 
Klein states that the simultaneous feeling of guilt and desire for reparation forms the foundation 
for love. 
Klein on Love and Mourning 
 We have discussed the ambivalent struggle of love and hate that erupts in the psyche of 
the infant, resulting in dread that the love object may be lost as a result of aggressive impulses 
towards the object or any number of disastrous external threats.  This anxiety brings forth 
feelings of guilt derived from recognition of hateful impulses directed towards the object.  This 
guilt is then met with a desire for reparation, to “make good the injuries we did in phantasy” 
(Klein, p.313, 1937).  In many cases, this motivation for reparation leads to the positive and 
nurturing caretaking characteristics within a love relationship.  However, in early development 
(and periods of regression later in life) the new well-intentioned desire for reparation may be 
thwarted by a prevailing manic omnipotence arising from the young child’s inability to trust that 
her own aggressive impulses can be kept at bay (Klein, 1940).  When reparation fails, desire to 
obtain control and triumph over the object causes paranoid persecutory anxieties to re-emerge, 
and a move towards the depressive position is once again necessary.  Klein (1940) identifies this 
as the manic position.   
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 We’ve discussed the feelings of mourning, guilt, and reparation that arise 
throughout the progression of the depressive position, as one realizes that the love object may be 
lost or destroyed.  In her most direct response to Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917), 
Klein (1940) discusses her interpretation of the mechanisms at work within the process of actual 
mourning.  When an external love object is in fact lost through death or by another form of 
separation, an increased anxiety arises regarding the stability of the internal object 
representation.  The mourner retreats to earlier anxieties of persecution and annihilation, 
contributing to internal chaos and lack of trust in the stability of all internal object 
representations.  If the external love object has been destroyed, the primary depressive anxiety 
realized, then all internal objects are potentially compromised. Eventually, as in the depressive 
position, each ambivalent interaction leads the mourner to accept that the internal object relations 
persist even while the external object is lost.  If the mourner is able to establish the lost love 
object within her ego, she is able to regain trust and security in the internal objects and attain 
some security in the world and hope for the future. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Discussion 
In the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), Lacuna Inc. offers a memory 
erasure procedure to provide a permanent relief from the pain that arises following the loss of a 
love object.  The Lacuna technician enters the subject’s subconscious through a brain mapping 
process and erases all memories of the lost loved one.  The subject is left entirely unaware that 
the relationship had occurred at all.  The erasure procedure does not allow for the preservation of 
good memories, which must be destroyed alongside the bad in order for it to be effective.  This 
means that while the distressed subject may choose to surpass the mourning process following 
the loss of the external object relationship, this comes at a cost of losing the whole internal object 
representation as well. 
In reality, a selective memory erasure procedure is not available nor is it scientifically 
feasible at this time.  However, if the procedure were to be available one may imagine that a 
sufferer of love-melancholy may elect to undergo this to cope with her distress.  The desire to 
erase a lost loved one from memory evokes Wells’ (2007) assertion that love-melancholy 
manifests as a resistance to mourning the lost object.  Wells’ (2007) observation arises from 
Freud’s (1915) work on transience, in which he states that the resistance to enjoying what is 
beautiful yet impermanent may be understood as a “revolt [in their minds] against mourning.” 
(p.306)  
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In the world of the film, the viewer follows protagonist Joel on a dreamlike journey 
through his subconscious as he undergoes the erasure of all memories of his former lover 
Clementine. Joel’s initial decision to erase Clementine can be viewed as a resistance of the 
mourning process.  However, while the procedure is underway Joel rebels against the erasure and 
scrambles to hold on to both the good and bad memories of Clementine. These encounters may 
be viewed as analogous to the process described by Klein (1935), wherein the subject moves 
from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position and a more whole object 
relationship through each struggle of ambivalence. In revisiting these memories Joel experiences 
pain, desperation, longing, and regret alongside joy, fulfillment, and desire ultimately arriving to 
a more whole internal object representation of Clementine.  This journey through memory leads 
to Joel’s eventual acceptance of the transience of romantic love. 
This film serves as the landscape for deeper exploration of how the theoretical concepts 
outlined in the previous chapters are operational within love-melancholy.  As discussed in the 
methodology chapter, the film functions as a case study in that a psychodynamic analysis is 
readily accessible through the film’s exploration of Joel’s subconscious world.  This chapter will 
outline Joel’s move from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position, his eventual 
mourning of the end of the relationship with Clementine, and the resulting hope for future 
attachments displayed in the film’s final scene.      
Joel and Clementine’s Object Relations 
As Joel undergoes the erasure procedure, he is confronted with the impending loss of his 
internal object representations of Clementine with each memory and fantasy he travels through.  
As viewers we experience Clementine both as an internal object representation existing in Joel’s 
subconscious, and as a real external object existing in the present reality of the film, with the 
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lines between these co-existing realities often blurred.  Joel’s memories include both actual 
events as well as dreamlike fantasies based on his internal object representations of Clementine.  
Memories and fantasies, marked by the processes of introjection and projection, are integral to 
the formation of all object relations (Klein, 1935). 
Another important object relations concept that is referenced throughout the film is the 
idea of part-objects vs. whole-objects.  Both in present-day scenes, and in the scenes that occur 
within Joel’s subconscious, Clementine cautions Joel against viewing her as a part object.  On 
two occasions within the film she delivers this line: 
Clementine: Too many guys think I’m a concept or I complete them or I’m gonna make 
them alive. I’m just a fucked up girl who’s looking for my own peace of mind, don’t assign 
me yours. 
 
This speaks to the themes of idealization/devaluation, highlighted through splitting, that 
are present throughout the film.  While Clementine expresses frustration with being viewed as a 
part object by Joel, her decision to erase him from memory points to a fragmented internal object 
representation of him and of their relationship. 
A Revolt Against Mourning 
Clementine revolts against mourning, turning towards Lacuna’s erasure procedure as an 
attempt to immediately and permanently escape the pain of her heartbreak.  She impulsively 
enacts her aggressive impulses towards Joel, choosing to destroy both the good object 
representation alongside the bad through the erasure.  Blue Clementine1 may be viewed as a 
                                                          
1 Clementine’s changing hair color is a cinematic element that helps to distinguish the various external/internal object 
representations of this character that we meet throughout the film. Following her erasure procedure, Clementine’s hair is blue.  
Here I use the signifier “blue Clementine” to refer to the external object Clementine who exists in present time in the world of the 
film.  
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melancholic subject experiencing manic decathexis and regression to the paranoid-schizoid 
position. 
We see Joel experience rejection, anger, and jealousy when he visits (blue) Clementine at 
work with the intentions of winning her back after an argument.  He brings her a Valentine’s gift, 
yet she treats him as a complete stranger and has formed a new romantic relationship that Joel 
bears witness to.  Joel, heartbroken, discusses this with a friend who informs him that 
Clementine decided to have him erased from memory with the help of Lacuna Inc.  In 
desperation, loneliness, and pain—Joel decides that he wants to have her erased as well. 
At this time, Joel (like Clementine) can be understood as a melancholic subject regressed 
to the paranoid-schizoid position.  This is evidenced in the splitting seen early on in the erasure 
process.  At first, Clementine is solely represented in Joel’s subconscious memories as bad 
object.  We see the cruel words exchanged in their breakup, boredom and resentment at a dinner, 
struggles in communication and hurt feelings.  Bad object Clementine is drunk, insecure, 
impulsive, nagging, and cruel.  Paranoid-schizoid annihilation anxieties are marked visually in 
Joel’s fantastical subconscious world.  Joel chases after Clementine as she barges out of the 
apartment. He desperately urges her to get in the car with him, she screams at him to get away; a 
car comes falling from the sky… 
Joel: Look at it out here! It’s all falling apart! I’m erasing you and I’m happy! You did it to 
me first! I can’t believe you did this to me. 
 
In this one statement the defining characteristics of Klein’s (1935) paranoid-schizoid 
position are evident: persecutory anxiety, fear of disintegration, paranoia, and splitting.  
Importantly, Joel’s fixation on the bad object relation at this time in the erasure speaks to the 
defensive function of splitting.  The splitting allows him to temporarily preserve the good 
internal object Clementine, but not for long. 
39 
 
As both Joel’s external object relationship and internal object representations of 
Clementine are being erased, we see the parallel process of blue Clementine entering into a 
distressed scramble to find her way back to what has been lost to her—the melancholic “object 
loss withdrawn from consciousness” (Freud, 1915, p. 245). In this moment of panic, paranoid-
schizoid anxieties of annihilation and disintegration are activated: 
Clementine: I don’t know! I don’t know! I’m lost, I’m scared, I feel like I’m disappearing! My 
skin’s coming off. I’m getting old! Nothing makes any sense to me! Nothing makes any sense… 
nothing makes any sense 
 
She is fixated in cyclical mania / melancholia, presenting with increasingly paranoid 
affect and unable to access security and trust in the stability of the world around her and in her 
internal objects. 
Joel Enters the Depressive Position 
As stated previously, Joel’s subconscious journey initially brings him through memories 
and fantasies in which Clementine is solely represented as bad object.  As his journey progresses, 
the memories contain more positive and neutral representations of Clementine which suggests a 
move towards increased ambivalence.  Joel’s internal object representations of Clementine have 
become less split, signifying Joel’s shift from a part object relation to a more whole object 
relation.  Klein (1935) asserts that the move from part object to whole object relations is a 
defining component of the depressive position. 
I suggest that Joel’s entrance into the depressive position is indicated by the visit to his 
memory of comforting Clementine during a moment of vulnerability. They are lying in bed 
under a brightly colored quilt, the lighting is soft and warm, and they face each other as Joel 
gently holds Clementine’s cheek.  She is tearful as she tells him about a painful memory from 
childhood and asks whether she is pretty.  Joel witnesses himself kissing Clementine as he 
urgently and compassionately assures her that she is pretty, to which she replies, “Joel, don’t 
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ever leave me.”  The scene then abruptly changes with harsh and shadowed lighting.  Joel is now 
alone, desperately grasping onto the sheets, scrambling forward as he pleads, “Please let me keep 
this memory, just this one.”  This invokes Klein’s (1935) assertion that once the object has been 
loved as a whole, its loss may be felt as a whole. 
At this point in the film, Joel has been thrown into the hallmark anxiety of the depressive 
position; fear of the impending loss of the loved object.  He frantically protests against the 
erasure, signifying the realization that his aggressive impulses against bad part-object 
Clementine may result in losing her entirely: 
Joel: I want to call it off… I’ll give you a sign. I want to call it off! 
Can you hear me? I don’t want this any more, I want to call it off! 
 
While Joel is desperate to avoid losing Clementine entirely, each memory he travels 
through seems to contribute to his development of the more whole internal object Clementine 
within his subconscious.  While he moves towards increased ambivalence towards Clementine, 
he is simultaneously confronted with the reality of the impending loss as she continually 
disappears from these memories. 
Once Joel enters the depressive position, he is met by a fantastical red Clementine2 on the 
frozen Charles River. For the first time within this subconscious journey, they share a mutually 
understood reality of what is occurring and begin to run from the Lacuna “eraser guys” together.   
Fantastical red Clementine now bands together with Joel as his collaborator and guide in the 
mourning process by suggesting that they retreat to Joel’s earlier memories, where she did not 
previously exist, in order to go off the map of memories designated by Lacuna to be erased. As 
they visit these earlier memories / fantasies, Joel encounters internal object representations of his 
earlier attachment figures.  Within these scenarios, red Clementine is alongside Joel embodying 
                                                          
2 I’ve coined this fantastical collaborator red Clementine, simply because her hair is now bright red. 
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various supportive roles within these memory/fantasies—i.e. a child version of Clementine 
comes to defend a child version of Joel when he is bullied.  This is significant, due to Klein’s 
(1940) assertion that once the real or imagined loss of a love object occurs within mourning, the 
stability of all existing internal objects are felt by the subject to be compromised.  Understanding 
red Clementine as an internal object representation that is part of Joel’s psyche, I view her 
inserted role in these memories as a device for Joel to regain security in his earlier internal 
objects while simultaneously increasing trust in his internal object representation of her.   
Mourning and Transience 
Red Clementine, as a device of Joel’s psyche, continues to guide Joel in embracing the 
mourning process as they travel through the last of his memories of her.  In one scene, they share 
a bittersweet reflection of the beginning of their relationship and Joel is again confronted with 
the pain of losing her.  He imagines whether there is a way to preserve the external object 
relationship, as the final loss of his internal object representation of her is looming: 
Joel: It would be different, if we could just give it another go around. 
Clementine: Remember me. Try your best. Maybe we can. 
 
She disappears, and Joel is left alone again. I read this moment as Clementine’s urging 
Joel to remember her as a whole object, holding the good and the bad simultaneously.  This 
highlights the central task of mourning, to be able to hold on to the whole internal object 
relationship while accepting that the external object relationship has ended. While Joel is not 
absolved of the sadness of his loss of Clementine, he is beginning to accept its inevitability. 
Coming full circle, we are eventually able to witness Joel’s position within the mourning 
process marked by his acknowledgment and acceptance of transience: 
Clementine: This is it Joel. It’s gonna be gone soon. 
Joel: I know. 
Clementine: What do we do? 
Joel: Enjoy it. 
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While the introjected red Clementine initially served to guide him through the mourning 
process, this moment illustrates that Joel himself has fully departed from his former resistance to 
mourning.  He is no longer running from the impending end of the external object relationship, 
demonstrating the increased security in his internal object representation of Clementine.  
Guilt and Reparation 
Klein (1937) explains that feelings of guilt and a desire for reparation are activated 
through the process of mourning, and contribute to one’s capacity for love.  Guilt arises as a 
result of the subject’s recognition of the aggressive impulses he had towards the bad part object, 
now realizing that the good and bad object are one whole.  The last fantasy/memory that Joel 
experiences during the erasure procedure highlights his guilt, as well as the desire for reparation.  
They are on the beach in Montauk, having just met for the first time, exploring an abandoned 
house that is collapsing and filling with sand.  Together they recall how Joel, afraid of 
Clementine’s bravado and perhaps the intensity of their connection, decided to leave the 
abandoned house and ran out without saying goodbye.  Joel expresses his regret about this 
moment, stating, “I wish I stayed.  I wish I’d done a lot of things. I wish I’d stayed.”  
Clementine, again as an internal object functioning as a component of Joel’s psyche, requests an 
alternate goodbye.  This can be understood as a manifestation of an arising desire for reparation: 
Clementine: What if you stayed this time? 
Joel: I walked out the door, there’s no memory left 
Clementine: Come back and make up a goodbye at least. Let’s pretend we had one. (they 
approach one another, she smiles) Bye, Joel. 
Joel: I love you 
Clementine: (whispers) Meet me in Montauk. 
 
At this moment, we see that Joel’s internal object representation of Clementine is solid 
enough that he is able to express his love for her while simultaneously bearing the pain of losing 
her.  The significance of their attachment remains, living on in the internalized whole object 
relation, alongside a full recognition that the external object relationship has ended. 
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Hope for the Future 
Joel and Clementine do in fact find their way back to one another, and meet in Montauk 
following the erasure procedure, both unsure of what has brought them there.  They meet again 
and begin to form a new connection, unaware of their shared history together.  Their mutual 
return to Montauk, the site of their initial meeting two years prior, serves as a reminder that 
internal object relations exist within the psyche beyond conscious memory.  Although memories 
of their former relationship have been erased, the internal object relationship has not fully 
disappeared.    
In the final scene of the film, Joel and Clementine are made aware of their former 
relationship when they each receive audiotape records from a disgruntled Lacuna employee. 
Completely unaware of any previous relationship, they are now met with the sound of their own 
voices confessing all of the things they hated about one another. Listening to these tapes, they are 
thrown headfirst into an ambivalent position as they are confronted with the pain of their former 
mutual heartbreak alongside the blossoming admiration they hold for one another.  Clementine, 
overwhelmed and confused by the hurtful content of the audiotapes, begins to leave.  Joel 
follows and asks her to stay, suggesting that they bear the complexity of this ambivalence 
together: 
Joel: I can't see anything I don't like about you 
Clementine: But you will, you will think of things and I'll get bored with you and feel trapped 
because that's what happens with me 
Joel: Okay 
Clementine: …Okay 
 
With full acknowledgement of the pain they once caused each other, Joel convinces 
Clementine to join him in embracing the potential of their new attachment.  We can understand 
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Joel as having done the work of mourning the loss of his former love relationship with 
Clementine.  He is able to carry the internal object relationship with a lens of ambivalence, and 
simultaneously accept that the external object relationship he once knew no longer exists.  In 
considering the significance of Joel’s mourning process, I recall Freud’s (1915) reflection on 
transience and his hopeful command; “We shall build up again all that war has destroyed, and 
perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before.” (p. 307)  Through mourning the actual 
or potential loss of a love object, in all of its wholeness, one may rebuild what has been 
destroyed while simultaneously creating an even stronger foundation for the future.  
Areas for Further Clinical Attention 
In my analysis of the clinical phenomena of love-melancholy through the theories of 
Freud and Klein and subsequent application to the film, I’ve come to understand that it is 
necessary for the clinician to explore the distressed patient’s resistance to mourning the loss of 
the love object.  By utilizing an object relations theoretical framework, the clinician may identify 
a regression to the paranoid-schizoid position marked by increased annihilation anxiety, splitting, 
idealization/devaluation, and part object relating.  While these defenses might be viewed as 
contributory to the patient’s experience of distress, it is important to remember that regression to 
the paranoid-schizoid position holds specific meaning for the love-melancholic patient as each 
moment of splitting brings the internal/external and good/bad objects closer together resulting in 
a more whole and ambivalent object relation.  If these regressions are viewed as essential to the 
process of mourning itself, and are in service of the development of the whole object relation, 
they can be conceived of by the clinician (and patient) as moments bearing opportunity for 
growth rather than setbacks. 
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There are numerous formal and informal clinical interventions across different modalities 
that may be accessed to help guide the patient towards the depressive position through 
development of a more whole object representation.  Regardless of which intervention the 
clinician chooses to utilize, the aim is to assist the patient in viewing the love object with 
increased ambivalence and thus more firmly establishing the internal object representation. 
As anxiety regarding the actual or imagined loss of the love object arises within the 
course of the depressive position, the clinician may consider the relative stability of the patient’s 
earlier internal objects and tailor interventions that encourage the reinstatement of these earlier 
attachment figures within the patient’s ego.  Furthermore, at this time the clinician may identify 
and assist the patient in exploring both the guilt arising from her realization of aggressive 
impulses towards the object as well as her fantasies of reparation.   
Conclusion 
I have come to the conclusion that a resolution of the distress of love-melancholy is only 
achievable through mourning the actual or possible loss of the love object.  The task of mourning 
is for the patient to fully incorporate the whole object relation internally, while simultaneously 
accepting the end (or the inevitable transience) of the external object relationship.  If the patient 
is able to achieve this, she may move through the distress of love melancholy with an increased 
sense of security in her self and in her earlier attachments, as well as increased hope for the 
future.  Just as in bereavement work, we as clinicians may tailor our conceptualization and 
interventions to support the love melancholic patient through the mourning process.  While 
mourning the loss of the love object may be a challenging and sorrowful road, it has the potential 
to be powerfully transformative. 
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